

## **REMARKS**

In view of the following comments, and pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.111, Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of the Office Action mailed June 07, 2006.

### **Summary**

Following the Examiner's response to the Applicants' amendment, filed on March 22, 2006, the Examiner withdrew previous grounds for rejection, and in a non-final Office Action mailed on June 07, 2006, provided new grounds for the rejection of Claims 1-3, 5-16 and 19-26. The pending claims are not being amended, and so are not listed above. The Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of pending Claims 1-3, 5-16, and 19-26 and allowance in view of the following remarks.

### **Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)**

Claims 1-3, and 5-8 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Pinard et al. (U.S. Patent No. 5,940,834) in view of Graham et al. (U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/0205537), and in further view of Chatani et al. (U.S. Patent No. 7,047,302). Claims 9-16, and 19-26 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Pinard in view of Graham, in further view of Chatani in further view of Kitain et al. (U.S. Patent No. 5,864,871). These rejections are traversed for the reasons noted below.

With respect to independent Claim 1, the Examiner has admitted that "Graham's capture and use of employment status information to control functionality of the system fails to explicitly teach using the information to control access by disabling the web page from any viewing on the network." Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, p. 5. However, to fill this gap, the Examiner states that Chatani "discloses using a database to disable access to a web page from any viewing on a network," and therefore, it would have been obvious, to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made, to "combine the personal web page system of Pinard and Graham with the database control access of Chatani in order to disable personal web pages because databases

are frequently used to store access control information for content including web page content.” Id. at pp. 5-6.

Applicants traverse this rejection and respectfully submit that Chatani, even in combination with Pinard and Graham, does not teach or suggest the structure of Claim 1 wherein “the personal homepage for said member is disabled from **any viewing** on the Internet when said employment status data indicates the member is not employed by an organization.”

The Examiner states that “Chatani is directed to using a database of [user (customer)] information to control access to web based content.” Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, p. 5. However, Chatani actually discloses the use of a database of customer information to control access to auxiliary content, which is content local to the same user. Chatani employs the client-server model to centralize access control of the primary content to “a server side system comprising a download service management server,” while auxiliary content is stored “on the detachable local storage medium on the client side of the system” where viewing is controlled by the local user. See Chatani, col. 3, ll. 27-34, and col. 4, ll. 51-57. Chatani recites: “The access software first checks ... whether or not the user has elected to disable viewing of auxiliary content or not.” Id. at col. 6, ll. 29-32. According to Chatani, “the [system configuration] is specifically intended to be used in a networked environment, in order to provide ... user-customized auxiliary content.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 60-65. Chatani’s user merely has the ability to send requests to the download service management server, but does not have the ability to control server side resources, or functionality affecting or the content viewing of any other user in the distributed model. Chatani teaches that the user has the ability to request primary content from the download service management server, and the option to disable viewing, **by the same user**, of auxiliary content residing on the local detachable storage media. See Id. at col. 5, ll. 8-16, and col. 2-3, ll. 61-67, 1-4. Chatani does not teach or suggest that the user can disable content viewing for any other user on the network.

Similarly, Graham's user accesses content based on the user's profile, including the user's affiliation with and functional role within the organization. See Graham, p. 2, ¶ 0024. Graham in view of Chatani suggests that where a former user's status later changes to that of a non-employee of the organization, viewing would become disabled *just for the former employee-user*, while access would remain available to current employee-users.

In contrast to Pinard's and Graham's users, Chatani's user has the discretion to elect whether or not to view content. Chatani also does not indicate that once the user has elected not to view content in a particular instance that the user is barred from electing to view the content at a later time. Chatani combined with Graham teach or suggest disabling an individual user's access to viewing of content based on the user's information. Pinard, Graham and Chatani in combination do NOT teach or suggest disabling any user's access to viewing of web pages.

In contrast to the system disclosed in Chatani, Claim 1 recites "the personal homepage for said member is disabled from **any viewing** on the Internet when said employment status data indicates the member is not employed by an organization." The specification teaches that "the system automatically disables **any viewing** of [a] person's homepage through the Internet. Likewise, if the salesperson is transferred to a non-sales position within the organization, data indicative of this status may be entered in the human resources database, which then is used to disable the person's homepage." Application, p. 5, ¶ 0023.

In order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, "all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art." See MPEP § 2143.03. Chatani does not disable information from **any viewing** on the Internet. In other words, in contrast to Claim 1, Chatani requires the user to elect to disable only the same user's ability to view the information. Chatani discloses that the user's information is the basis for assessing

whether content is disabled for viewing as to the same user, while not disabling viewing as to other users.

Therefore, the combination of Pinard in view of Graham, in further view of Chatani does not teach or suggest the limitation of independent Claim 1 "wherein the personal homepage for said member is disabled from **any viewing** on the Internet when said employment status data indicates the member is not employed by an organization."

With respect to independent Claim 14, the Examiner rejects Claim 14 in part based on the portion of the claim directed toward a method for the system of Claim 1, where homepages are disabled from any viewing by using a database. Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, pp. 10-11. However, Chatani, as the Applicants have pointed out above, does not teach or suggest the limitation of Claim 1, because Chatani does NOT disable information from **any viewing** on the Internet. Chatani requires the user to elect to disable viewing only as to the same user viewing the information.

Claim 14 discloses a method of both "periodically retrieving updated personal data from the human resources database and **updating** said personal homepage with the updated personal data, and automatically disabling the personal homepage for **any viewing** on the Internet when said updated personal data includes data indicating that the member is not employed by the organization." The specification further teaches that "updated data is periodically retrieved from the human resource database, and the member's homepage is automatically disabled from the Internet when the human resource database indicates that the member's employment with the organization has been terminated." Application, p. 2, ¶ 0007. The embodiment depicted in FIG. 7 and the specification combine to teach that the production server database is updated with data from a human resources database by performing a periodic batch transfer. See Application, p. 10, ¶¶ 0037-0038. The periodic batch transfer is used to both update pages and disable any viewing of homepages.

The Examiner rejects the remaining portion of Claim 14 directed toward updating the personal web page. Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, pp. 10-11. Although the Examiner admits that "Pinard, Graham and Chatani fail to disclose updating the web page," the Examiner states that "Kitain discloses updating the web page." *Id.* Kitain recites: "According to this embodiment, corporate information is acquired, indexed and updated." Kitain, col. 42, ll. 64-65. However, as the Applicants have pointed out above, Claim 14 recites a method of automatically disabling any viewing of homepages, in addition to updating pages.

Therefore, the combination of Pinard in view of Graham, in further view of Chatani in further view of Kitain does not teach or suggest the limitation of independent Claim 14 of both **updating** homepages and "automatically disabling the personal homepage for **any viewing** on the Internet when said updated personal data includes data indicating that the member is not employed by the organization."

Hence, the combination of references does not disclose the recited limitations and independent Claims 1 and 14 are allowable. Dependent Claims 2-3, 5-13, 15-16, and 19-26 are also allowable for at least the same reasons. Notwithstanding, the Applicants submit additional remarks below regarding dependent Claims 3 and 8.

Regarding dependent Claim 3, the Examiner states that "Pinard discloses the use of the PBX to generate web pages." Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, pp. 6-7. However, Pinard discloses that in "a further alternative embodiment of the invention, the web-pages generated by the present method may be designed to **interface** with a PBX." Pinard, col. 9, ll. 30-32. Pinard does not teach or suggest a PBX server being used to **generate** web pages. Neither does the PBX server, in Pinard, allow one to develop, test, store or experiment with a webpage; it merely allows one to view the web pages..

In contrast, Claim 3 recites an additional server used to "generate, develop, test, store or experiment with personal homepages." Therefore, a prima facie case of obviousness has not been made out for Claim 3.

Regarding dependent Claim 8, the Examiner states that "Pinard discloses in Figure 4A at reference signs 330, 340 and 350 point of contact information." Office Action mailed June 07, 2006, p. 7. Pinard discloses a "web page generator that ... provides automatic web page creation of an organizational directory." Pinard, col. 1, ll. 52-53. Pinard suggests a one-to-one relationship between the point of contact information and the generated web page.

In contrast, Claim 8 recites "the homepages generated for the sales team are populated with a single point of contact." Similarly, the specification teaches a one-to-many relationship between the single point of contact and members on the sales team where "similar personalized components used for individual financial consultant's home pages may be used for a team or branch homepage [including a] means to communicate with the team." See Application, pp. 12-13, ¶¶ 0042-0043. Therefore, a prima facie case of obviousness has not been made out for Claim 8.

## **Conclusion**

Therefore, in view of the above remarks, Applicants respectfully submit that this application is in condition for allowance and such action is earnestly requested.

If for any reason the Examiner is not able to allow the application, he is requested to contact the Applicants' undersigned attorney at (312) 321-4200.

Application Serial No. 10/087,158  
Response Dated September 6, 2006  
Response to Office Action mailed June 07, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Marc V. Richards", written over a horizontal line.

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